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Abstract
Results from individual-choice, time-discounting experiments reveal that people
have short-run discount rates that can vary widely according to the setting. Little work
has examined whether the same short-run discounting that is observed in individualchoice experiments extends to strategic settings. This paper uses a simple two-player
contest, with a unique Nash equilibrium, to explore the extent to which people discount
in games, and whether they anticipate that others will do so. We find that people do
not significantly discount the future, nor do they act as if others will.
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Introduction

Most economic decisions involve at least some tradeoff between current and future consumption. Important decisions in the realm of health, education, and savings, are all determined
in part by the extent to which people value today versus the future. Research on time
discounting has focused on individual decisions (see Andreoni and Sprenger 2010 for a discussion), but there are many situations in which intertemporal decisions are made in strategic
settings. This paper looks at the interplay of subjective discounting and strategic behavior
in one such area, namely contests. In contests with a time-component, each party must
anticipate the cost of delay to the other party and make investment decisions accordingly.
Three common examples in the contest literature are patent races, sports competitions, and
politics. All three regularly involve decisions where costs are incurred in advance of a future
reward, and where each party must anticipate their rival’s discounted value of the future
prize. Firms make current investments in R&D based upon the anticipated future actions of
their rivals and market conditions. Sports teams make hiring decision and engage in costly
training prior to entering a tournament. Political candidates campaign well in advance of
elections, which themselves are well in advance of the winner taking office.
In order to measure individual discount rates, respondents are generally asked a series of
binary choice questions that determine the amount m that makes them indifferent between
receiving x today and x + m in a future period. The evidence suggests that beyond the
traditional model of exponential discounting, people exhibit a taste for immediate gratification, or “present-bias.” That is, researchers consistently find heavy discount factors (about
0.6) when people are choosing between an immediate reward and a future reward, whereas
they find much more patient behavior (discount factors close to 1) when people are choosing
between two future rewards (Frederick, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue 2002). Recent research
suggests that revealed discount rates are a result of multiple systems in the brain interacting
with one another (Shefrin and Thaler 1981, Bernheim and Rangel 2004, O’Donoghue and
Loewenstein 2004, Fudenberg and Levine 2004). It appears that present-bias is linked to
the emotional (limbic) system of the brain, which holds a high value for immediate rewards.
In contrast, patience is linked to the analytical (pre-frontal cortex) system in the brain,
which seems to value rewards more constantly across time. To model behavior across time,
it is therefore important to understand the situations that lend themselves to greater time
discounting.
In individual decision choices, it has been shown that discount factors vary across elicitation methods (Andersen et al 2008, Andreoni and Sprenger 2010, Takeuchi 2011, Laury,
McInnes, Morgan, and Swarthout 2011) and can depend on context and other psychological

2

factors (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999, McLure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen 2004). All of
these papers, however, arrive at the same general finding: in individual choice settings, people heavily discount the immediate future and only slightly discount the distant future more.
Despite this finding, researchers of interactive environments, continue to use exponential discounting as the standard discounting method. In fact, some theoretical literature has argued
that quasi-hyperbolic discount factors cannot be sustained in interactive environments. For
instance, Ainslee (2001) argues that people form rules when interacting with others that
mitigate their ability to fall victim to a money-pump while Laibson and Yariv (2007) argue
that competition eliminates any rents that can be extracted from people with such preferences. We believe our paper is the first to examine how time-discounting is manifested in
interdependent games. We ask whether people exhibit the same heavy discount factors in
strategic settings as they do in individual choice settings, and whether they anticipate that
their opponents discount so heavily. There are two reasons to believe that people may have
different discount rates in games: (1) the tradeoff between receiving money immediately and
in the future is less salient in a game than when a person is asked directly in part because
of the inherent strategic uncertainty regarding the behavior of the other players, and (2) the
brain’s analytical abilities are called upon in strategic settings since people must think about
how others will behave, and what others, in turn, think about their behavior.1
To explore time discounting in a strategic environment, we design an experiment in a
simple setting: a two player contest with a time dimension and a single winner. Numerous
papers have considered contests from both theoretical and behavioral perspectives (see Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad, 2008 for a review). The two prevalent streams of single winner
contests are all-pay auctions and Tullock contests. In all pay auctions, the winner is determined by which party invests more. The optimal behavior in such a contest involves playing
a mixed-strategy equilibrium (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye, et al., 1993). By contrast, in
Tullock (1980) contests the likelihood of winning is proportional to the amount invested and
there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium.2 For this reason, we use a Tullock contest with
a proportional probability of winning in our experiments for simplicity.
We depart from previous contest experiments by adding an element of timing into the
contest by varying when the prize is allocated (immediately vs. the future). When the
timing of prizes vary across contest participants, a strategic factor is introduced in the
1

Past research has shown that if one region of the brain is occupied, it affects overall decision making.
For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) tested the two-self model by looking to see what happens to the
long-run self’s ability to regulate the short-run self when the long-run self is burdened with an occupying task
memorizing a seven-digit number. The authors discover that people act more impatiently (choose chocolate
cake over a bowl of fruit) when their long-run self is impaired in this way (memorizing a seven-digit number
vs. a three-digit number).
2
The all pay auction with a deterministic outcome is a limiting case of a Tullock (1980) contest.
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game. The contest literature has nominally focused on situations where the timing of the
prize is independent of who wins the contest. However, work on asymmetric prize values
more generally (Nti, 1999; Baik 2004) sheds light on the predicted behavior of agents who
are making decisions at different points in time. The general result with asymmetric prizes
is that the player with the higher value invests more. Further, as the high value increases,
that player will invest more while the low value player becomes discouraged and invests less.
The methodology of experimental economics offers an ideal tool for this type of work
because the researcher can exogenously manipulate the timing and size of the prize payment
and can control how investment affects the likelihood of winning. By varying the timing of
the prize between the present and the future, the value to the bidder of winning is altered
when the person significantly discounts the future. Our experiment thus provides a joint
test of how much people discount and whether they strategically take advantage of others’
discounting.

2

Experimental Design

Our experimental design uses a proportional contest where two players, i and j, bid for
a prize, P = $5. Each player is endowed with E = $5, and must forfeit any amount bid
regardless of whether or not the player actually wins the prize. Let bidi denote player i’s
i
. Ignoring the timing of prize
bid. The probability that a player wins the prize equals bidbid
i +bidj
i
. In the symmetric, twopayments, player i’s objective is to maximize E − bidi + P · bidbid
i +bidj
∗
player, single-period contest, the optimal bid of each player is bid = P4 . In the experiments,
we impose the constraint that bidi ≤ E to avoid a loss of experimental control associated
with bankruptcy.3 This constraint should not be binding because P = E.4
To introduce time discounting, we employ a 2x2 between subjects experimental design.
The first dimension is the date which each player receives the prize if she wins (now or in
one week) and the second dimension is the date which their rival receives the prize (now or
in one week). Since our experiments only involve a single future period one week out, we
simply denote the discount rate over this interval as β̃.5 . If people heavily discount the near
3

IRB constraints do not allow a participant to earn less than $0 in the study. This means that all nominal
losses result in the same payoff to the subjects, namely $0, and therefore subjects would not incur a real
marginal loss from a further reduction in their nominal earnings.
4
It is possible that the subject receives a utility from winning the prize separate from the value of the
prize itself, in which case this condition is not sufficient to ensure the constraint is not binding. This value
would have to be intrinsic to the subject as there was no public announcement or indication of who won a
contest. Further, the size of the value of winning would have to be relatively large for the constraint to bind
because the optimal bid is much lower than E.
5
We do not try and differentiate whether people discount hyperbolically or exponentially. We simply look
to see whether the heavy short-run discount factors found in many other studies is found here. Under the
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future (i.e. β̃ is substantially less than 1 as previous individual choice research suggests), we
should observe bids that are much lower for the same nominal prize received in the future
than if it was received today. If on the other hand people do not heavily discount the future
(i.e. β̃ is close to 1), we would expect to observe little to no difference in bidding behavior
based upon when the bidder would receive the prize.6 If people anticipate that others heavily
discount the future, we should observe bids that are lower when one’s opponent is receiving
the prize in the future as compared to when the opponent would receive the prize today. If
people do not anticipate that their rivals heavily discount the near future, then the timing
of the opponent’s prize should have no effect on bidding behavior.
In the situation where both parties are paid now, the predicted behavior is as described
above, namely bid∗i = P4 . When both parties are paid in the future, the objective function
i
and the optimal bid becomes bid∗i = β̃ · P4 .7 This
for player i becomes E − bidi + β̃P · bidbid
i +bidj
result is intuitive, if the receipt of the prize is pushed into the future, the prize is worth less
to both parties and people should bid less for it. If the future is discounted by β̃, the bids
are as well.
When player i would receive the prize now, but player j would receive the prize in one
week, then the players no longer have symmetric objective functions and resulting first order
P
conditions. In this case, player i’s first order condition is −1+bidj · (bidi +bid
2 = 0 while player
j)
β̃P
= 0. The solution to these two simultaneous
(bidi +bidj )2
2P
β̃
bid∗j = (1+β̃)2 . This means that the person who receives the

j’s first order condition is −1 + bidi ·
equations is bid∗i =

β̃P
(1+β̃)2

and

discounted prize in the future bids β̃ of what the person who would receive it now bids,
bid∗j = β̃ · bid∗i .
The bidding best-response function denotes how a person’s optimal bid should vary according to the rival’s bid. As shown in Figure 1, the best response curve depends on how
much the bidder discounts the prize. If the prize is received today (or the future is not
significantly discounted), bids should be higher than if the prize is received in the future and
standard exponential discounting model u(ct ) = β t u(c0 ) where u(ct ) denotes the utility from receiving c at
time t. With this framework, β̃ = β t . Under hyperbolic discounting u(ct ) = βδ t u(c0 ) for t > 0 where δ acts
as a standard exponential discount factor and β captures a present bias. With this framework, β̃ = βδ t
6
It is possible that people are impatient in intertemporal contests, but appear to have a discount factor
near 1 due to confusion, experimenter demand effects, or some other explanation. These are potential
concerns in any experiment and we take the usual precautions to reduce these alternative explanations as
much as possible.
7
In this analysis, it is assumed that each player discounts the future by the same rate, β̃, and has correct
beliefs about the other player’s discount factor. Of course, it is possible that the players have differing
discount factors or inaccurate beliefs about the other player’s discount factor. However, given a discount
rate for each player and a belief about their rival’s discount rate, the same strategic principles hold: both
players will want to decrease their bid in response to 1) receiving the prize further in the future or 2) their
opponent receiving the prize further in the future.
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Figure 1: Bidding Best-Response Function.
its value is discounted. Given that P =$5, the highest value a person should ever bid in this
auction is$1.25, occurring when the bidder does not discount the prize and is in response to
an equal bid by the rival. If the rival bid is low, the best response is to bid slightly higher
than the rival. This ensures the player has a majority chance of winning the object at a
low cost. If the rival bid is high, the best response is again to bid low, because escalation
becomes too costly.
With the assumption that β̃ ∈ (0, 1) we have a strict ordering of equilibrium bidding in
each situation regardless of P . The size of the difference depends on β̃. Table 1 provides the
predicted bid by treatment and the relative ranking between treatments. Table 1 also gives
the optimal bid if β̃ = 0.5, 0.7, and 1 for P = $5.8 At this prize size, the timing of when the
rival would receive the prize has only a small effect on predicted bids, but the timing of one’s
own receipt of the prize does a have a substantial impact if people exhibit discounting.9
The paid experiments were conducted during two 120 person sections of a principles of
economics course at a state university. The course instructor was not one of the researchers
and the participants were assured that the instructor would not be informed of what any
participant did. Our use of a classroom is non-standard, and concerns can be raised that
8

Previous individual choice experiments vary in their estimates of β̃ but a value of 0.6 is typical.
To create separation between optimal bids due to the timing of the rival’s prize would require considerably
larger prize amounts. For example, if β̃= 0.7 and P = $100 the predicted bid for someone who would receive
the prize now would only vary by $0.80 based upon the timing of the rival’s prize. Very large stakes
experiments might be worthwhile if we observed present bias, but as discussed in the next section we do not.
9
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Table 1: Equilibrium Bids by Treatment Ranked in Descending Order.
Own Prize

Rival’s Prize

Received

Received

Now

Now

Now

In one week

In one week

In one week

In one week

Now

Bid

Bid if P = $5
β̃ = 0.5 β̃ = 0.7

P
4
β̃P
(1+β̃)2
β̃P
4
β̃ 2 P
(1+β̃)2

β̃ = 0.1

$1.25

$1.25

$1.25

$1.11

$1.21

$1.25

$0.63

$0.88

$1.25

$0.56

$0.85

$1.25

students are apt to act in a way so to please the instructor.10 However, we felt that the
advantage the classroom served to minimize the transaction costs associated with returning
for payment at a later date was the dominant concern. To illustrate how use of the lab can
pose greater difficulties, suppose that some subjects were uncertain about their ability to
return for their future payments. This uncertainty would manifest itself into overbidding on
current prizes, implying much higher future discounting.11
At the start of class a copy of a consent form was projected onto a screen at the front
of the class. Students were informed of how the experiment would be conducted and large
identical envelopes were passed out. Students who wished to participate were instructed to
take an envelope.12 Inside the large envelope were two normal sized white envelopes and
the directions/response form. A copy of the directions/response form is included in the
appendix. One of the envelopes was labeled “Today’s Money” and the other was labeled
“Next Week’s Money.” Participants wrote their names on both envelopes and completed
the response form and then placed these items back inside the large envelope. The large
envelopes were then collected and taken to another room. The data collection process took
approximately 10 minutes at the start of class, after which the instructor lectured as normal.
10

This is an argument similar to that of demand effects in the lab, and is ultimately a question of dominance
(Smith 1982). Eckel and Grossman (2000) show that students in the classroom give more to charity than
do traditionally recruited students in the lab for each of two dictator treatments. However, the difference
between treatments was not affected by the subject pool. As argued by Zizzo (2010), demand effects are
problematic to the degree they vary with the treatments.
11
As described by Andreoni and Sprenger (2010), equating the transaction costs and credibility of payment between current and future periods is important when measuring subjective discount rates because
unanticipated (by the experimenter) additional costs or uncertainty associated with future payments can
mistakenly be interpreted as greater discounting. Kirby and Marakovic (1995) minimize transaction costs by
delivering the rewards in person on the night it is due. Coller and Williams (1999) control for this problem
by using multiple future periods, so any uncertainty about the future is equally applied to both periods.
Horowitz (1991), like us, uses the classroom.
12
Subjects who did not want to participate could either not take an envelope or take an envelope and
simply not fill out the required information which included name, student ID number, and bid. Less than
5% of the students chose not to participate.
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While the students were in lecture, the envelopes were sorted by treatment, paired randomly, and the contest winner was determined. Cash payments were then stuffed into the
appropriately labeled envelopes for each person.13 So that no one could tell which treatment
anyone else was in or who won a contest, everyone received a $1 payment in their “Next
Week’s Money” envelope in addition to any prize payment. This procedure also equalized
any perceived risk or burden associated with having to interact with the experimenters twice
across treatments.14 The envelopes labeled “Today’s Money” were taken back to the classroom 5 minutes before the end of the period and handed out to each person. The envelopes
labeled “Next Week’s Money” were brought back to class the following week and given out
in a similar procedure. Care was taken to select weeks that were not expected to have a high
demand for money or missing class such as just after an exam or close to a holiday.

3

Experimental Results

A total of 183 subjects participated in this study.15 Table 2 gives the average bid by treatment
and Figure 2 shows the kernel density of bids by treatment. Average bids are all substantially
(and significantly) greater than the predicted values in Table 1. From Figure 2, the attraction
to integer bids is apparent from the local maxima at $1, $2, and $3. Importantly, these
patterns are similar to previous results (Millner and Pratt 1989; Davis and Reilly, 1998;
Potters et al., 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b) suggesting
that our results are consistent with previous contest experiments. For our purposes it is
not important whether or not people are bidding according to the equilibrium predictions.
Rather the point of interest is whether or not bids vary with the timing of the prize. The
answer is no: average bids also show little evidence of heavy discounting nor any anticipation
of such discounting in rivals.
The Bidding behavior when both players are bidding for the prize today (average bid of
$2.05) is similar to the bidding behavior (average bid =$2.15) when both players are bidding
to receive the prize is in one week, (z=0.348, p-value = 0.728). The average bid of those
expecting the prize today did not differ significantly from the average bid of those expecting
13

This process was quite labor intensive and would not have been possible without the help of a small
army of colleagues and graduate students who went through training in advance of the experiment.
14
Previous research has focused on the perceived risk of the subjects that the future payment would not
be delivered or the transaction costs of having to deal with the experimenter multiple times (see Andreoni
and Sprenger 2010). Our use of a class experiment was intentionally designed to counteract those effects.
15
Due to the classroom procedures discussed in the previous section and the need to include everyone who
wished to participate, we could not ensure that every subject could be matched with a unique rival. In the
instances in which a subject had no rival, they paid their bid and received the prize as though their rival
had bid 0. Subjects were not informed of this rule.
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Table 2: Average Bid and Standard Deviations by Treatment.
Rival Receives Prize
Player

Now

Receives
Prize

In one week

Now

In one week

$2.05

$2.35

(1.41)

(1.77)

$2.18

$2.15

(1.37)

(1.53)

Figure 2: Kernel Density of Bids by Treatment.
to receive the prize in the future.
Furthermore, conditional on when the rival receives the prize, the amount bid does not
depend upon when the player would receive the prize. For those whose rival received the
prize immediately, the difference in the average bid between those receiving the prize now
and in the future was $0.13, an insignificant difference (z=0.468, p-value =0.639). This
change is nominally in the opposite direction from that predicted assuming present bias.
For those whose rival would receive the prize in one week, the difference in average bids
between those who would receive the prize now and in one week was $0.20, an insignificant
difference (z=0.578, p-value =0.563). There was also no deference in the distribution of bids:
(1) conditional on the rival receiving the prize today, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows
that the distributions of bids did not significantly differ depending on when one received
the prize (p-value = 0.951) and (2) conditional on the rival receiving the prize in the future,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the distributions of bids did not significantly differ
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depending on when one received the prize (p-value = 0.704). We find no evidence of present
bias in the bidding behavior of the players.
We also find no evidence that people expect their rivals to heavily discount the future.
Conditional on when players would receive the prize themselves, the amount bid does not
depend upon when their rival would receive the prize. For those who received the prize
immediately, the average bid was $2.05 when the rival would receive the prize immediately
and $2.35 when the rival would receive the prize in one week, an insignificant difference
(z=-0.913, p-value =0.361). This difference is nominally in the opposite direction from that
predicted if people anticipate their rivals are heavy discounters. For those who received
the prize in one week, the average bid was $2.18 when the rival would receive the prize
immediately and $2.15 when the rival would receive the prize in one week, an insignificant
difference (z=0.101, p-value =0.919). However, there is only a small nominal change in
optimal bids except in cases of extreme present bias or extremely large stakes, so this is not
too surprising.16 Conditional on own bids, we also tested whether there was a difference in
the bid distributions due to when the rival was receiving the prize. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test shows there was no significant difference in these two distributions: (1) conditional on
the bidder receiving the prize today (p-value = 0.226) and (2) conditional on the receiving
the prize in the future (p-value = 0.275).
Together, these findings suggest that in simple strategic contest settings, people do not
seem to have large discount rates. In fact, it seems that behavior is more consistent with
exponential discounting than with hyperbolic discounting, so that a short delay in the reward
has little effect on perceived value. This is consistent with Andreoni and Sprenger (2010)
who also finds little evidence of large discounting in a situation that could be described as
more analytical than emotional.17

4

Conclusion

In individual settings, it has been shown that people heavily discount the future. It is thought
that this hyperbolic discounting is the result of the interaction between the analytical and
emotional systems of the brain. When the emotional system, which seeks immediate rewards,
is aroused, then people appear impatient. When the analytical system, which uses reason
to make tradeoffs, is aroused, then people appear more patient. Within the context of
individual choice decisions, evidence indicates that stimulating one of the systems greatly
16

See footnote 9 for a discussion of how large the stakes would have to be to separate bids as the timing
of the rival’s prize changes at previously estimated levels of present bias.
17
Our results are also consistent with previous work by Anderson and Stafford (2003) and Anderson and
Freeborn (2010) which find little evidence of discouragement in contests with asymmetric values.
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affects observed time discounting.
This paper is a first attempt to see how time discounting is affected when made in a
strategic setting. We measure discounting using a simple game: a two-player Tullock contest
with a single winner and unique Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, where the timing of
prizes varies. The choice made in this setting differs from the typical direct elicitation choice
in that (1) the tradeoff between money today and money in the future is less salient and (2)
the choice involves secondary analytical aspects which require attention.
We find no evidence that bidders in our experiment excessively discount the future nor do
we find evidence that they expect their rivals do so. Instead, we find behavior that is similar
to what has been observed in other contest experiments, namely widely dispersed bids that
are on average greater than what is predicted by the unique Nash equilibrium. Our results
can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, the results could be seen as casting doubt on
the model of hyperbolic discounting, consistent with the message of Andreoni and Sprenger
(2010). A second explanation is that the today reward is uncertain, and it has been shown
in situations with high uncertainty, participants do not show heavy discounting (Andersen
2008, Laury et al 2011). If this was the case, it would suggest that even in mildly uncertain
environments, present bias may disappear. Finally, an alternative explanation is that the
strategic considerations of the contest cause the analytical (pre-frontal cortex) portion of the
brain to dominate the emotional (limbic) system making people appear more patient.18
Admittedly, this is only a single experiment, yet the implications it has about time
discounting in everyday strategic settings is both important and interesting. For instance,
a major criticism against hyperbolic discounting is that if people actually discounted so
heavily, others could use this fact to take advantage of them in various transactions. Our
findings show that this is not necessarily the case. In our experiment, when participants
played a strategic game, they not only seemed to exhibit little discounting, but they also
expected that others do the same. Further research is needed to explore the robustness of
this finding. In particular we believe that other strategic games (both easy and hard) need
to be studied to see whether discounting systematically depends on the complexity of the
game and thus the amount of analytical thinking required.

18

Similar results could also arise in individual choice experiments that call upon the pre-frontal cortex.
For example, the convexification process of Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) may cause the analytical portion
of the brain to dominate, thus explaining their findings.
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5

Appendix

The instructions below are for the treatment in which both players would receive the prize
during the class period in which they made their decisions. Bold font was used for emphasis
with the subjects as to the timing of the prize. The other treatments were similar except
for the discussion of the timing of when prizes were received. The page margins were set so
that the direction fit a single page.

Experiment Instructions
This is an experiment in economic decision making. How much you earn will depend in part on
what choices you make, so it is important that you understand these directions completely. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand and a researcher will come to you. Except for questions
asked to the experimenter, it is important that you do not talk or communicate with anyone else
in this experiment.
You have been randomly matched with someone else in the experiment and each of you is being
given $5 to be paid to you at the end of class today and $1 to be paid at the end of class in one
week. Please legibly print your name on the outside of the envelope you received marked today’s
money and on the outside of the one marked next week’s money.
Both you and the person you are matched with can use the $5 you will receive today to bid on
a $5 prize. The chance the $5 prize will go to you is proportional to the amount you bid relative
to the amount the person you are matched with bids. Any amount you bid will be deducted from
the $5 you will receive today, regardless of whether or not you win the $5 prize. Similarly, any
amount the person you are matched with will be deducted from his or her today’s money.
If you win the $5 prize it will be added to your next week’s money envelope. If the person you
are matched with wins the $5 prize then it will be added to his or her next week’s money envelope.
To bid, you will simply write the amount you want to bid at the bottom of this form. Once you
have determined your bid and written your name on your two white envelopes, you can put this
sheet and the two envelopes back into the large brown envelope so the experimenters may collect
it.
Let’s look at a couple of examples.
Example: If you bid $2.35
 and the person you are matched with bids $4.56 then the chance you
2.35
will win the $5 is 34% = 2.35+4.56
. This means that out of 100 trials you would expect to win
the prize 34 times. Notice that you would not get back the $2.35 you bid.
Example: If you bid $0.87
 and the person you are matched with bids $0.29 then the chance you
0.87
will win the $5 is 75% = 0.87+0.29
. This means that out of 100 trials you would expect to win
the prize 75 times. Notice that you would not get back the $0.87 you bid.

16

After all of the bids have been collected, the experimenters will determine if you or the person you
are matched with won the $5 and then distribute the payment you are due today in the envelope
marked today’s money. We will return in one week to make the payment you are due at that time
in the envelope marked next week’s money.
To summarize, your bid will be deducted from today’s money and the prize (if you win) will be
added to next week’s money. The bid of the person you are matched with will be deducted from his
or her today’s money and the prize (if he or she wins) will be added to his or her next week’s money.
By completing this form, I acknowledge that I have read the accompanying information regarding
this study, am at least 18 years of age, and am voluntarily agreeing to participate in this study.
My bid is
Name
UA ID

. This will be deducted from the $5 I will receive today.
Signature
Total Payment (completed by researcher)
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